Design aspects of zeppelin operations from case histories by Maiersperger, W. P.
.i N.76- 15040
_ DESIGN ASPECTS OF ZEPPELIN OPERA_IONS
_ PR_ CASE HISTORIES
J
; / walter P. Malersperger* _-
_ " ABSTR_E T- This paper deals with some widely held beliefs
_o_- concerning the practicability of rigid airships in air
_,_ _ carrier operations. The paper shows, by a review of past
....... • operational experience, and some basic aerostatic theory,
_ their actual record and the reasons for their demise.
Problems of atmospheric density and temperature varia-
;'. tlons, meterologlcal factors, aerodynamic stability and
control, and mooring difficulties are discussed and re-
_ fated to actual case histories. Structural and flight
efflciencies are compared to airplane efficiencies for
airplanes contemporary with the zeppelin as well as
:, modern designs. The difficulty of supporting new,
commercial airship developments on an economic bas_s is
,_' made clear.
"In the development of human flight the zeppelin episode could only
have been a very brief one". So wrote the master mariner of airships,
Hugo Eckener, with respect to air carzier operations. Because refer-
ence books, semi-professional Journals and current airship enthusiasts
have published a great deal of mis-information about bouyant aircraft,
it is the purpose of this paper to put on the record of this workshop
some physical laws and design factors that establish the truth of
Eckener's observation.
Ship Analogy - Sir Goozge Cayley appears to have started the analogy
with surface shi_s by mugqesting that airship lift be subdivided intO
multiple compartments for greater safety. C. P. Burgess wrote that
because rigid airships had this feature, they could lose one or more
lifting cells without endangering the airworthiness of the ship.
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i_-.'' Actually, thls feature only helps prevent instant catastrophy. To re-
main aloft the airship must jettison weight in equal proportion to the
• lift it lost. The weight dropped must leave the airship in satisfact-
I ory trim, or it will experience extreme difficulty in maintaining con-
,_.,_A trol of any forward speed, and thus, its chances of reaching a safe ,
_L ,_ haven. Therefore, any lose of lift jeopardizes the airworthiness of
_-: any airship.
/ The SHENANDOAH and the R-33 both escaped disaster after being torn
/_ from their mooring masts and thereby suffering the loss of forward
•_ lifting cells. On the other hand the ITALIA and the MACON were both
; _ lost after suffering deflation of their aft cells. The disparity in
_' the analogy is that surface ships have an immense reserve bouyancy.
s NO airship ever had any while on a design mission. A ship with a I
_ flooded compartment sinks deeper into the water, all of its hull above
water constituting reserve bouyancy. The airship with deflated cell ;
_,.. sinks all the way to earth, unless it drops weight, as stated above. ,
_" This ship analogy is one of the most basic _nd persistent myths, so it
was treated first.
d_$6#
/ Figure I. Ship and Airship cross-sections
Shipping li the cheapest and best node of long distance transportation
known to man. It does not follow that because airships are also bouy-
ant veEsell, they are equally as attractive. Because water is more
than 800 times as dense as air, there is a striking difference between
_r
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- the utilization of volume aboard a ship and an airship. In Fig. I it
is seen that it is almost impossible to overload a ship with most
industrial prodvct_, -only solid materials and ore can do that. Gen-
erally, the stability of the ship becomes the limiting factor, not the
_ load which may be placed aboard. In contrast, the passenger and cargo
_- space on the airship is so small as to be almost unrecognizable. As
:i an Englishman has put it, "The wisdom is questionable, of creating an
airship as large as the M_'_RETANIA for a load only so large as a lorry :
can carry".
Before leaving this analogy, it is necessary to point out that only "_
captive balloons operate lighter than air. In normal operation, an
airship is not lighter than air. Like a ship, it is equal in weight
to the weight of the fluid it displaces. Balloons, and all airships,
which are really dirigible balloons, should be called bouyant aircraft, ':
and the term 'lighter than air' eliminated as part of the myth
surrounding the subject.
AEROSTATICS
Eckener reminds one that every airship landing is essentially a balloo_
landing. Misunderstanding concerning the nature of balloon flight be-
gan with the first public notice, the 23 August Proclamation of the
French Government, issued, "so that alarm be not occasioned to the
people". It spoke of balloon experiments than in progress and revealed
the operating principle as "filled with inflammable air" a balloon will
"rise toward heaven till _k in equilibrium with the surrounding a_r".
Ever since, most people believe that a balloon will rise until it is in
',' equilibrium with less dense air at higher altitude, and conversely, •
that a descending balloon will sink until it is in equilibrium with
_ lower, mo_e dense air. In fact, aerostatlc llft is unstable lift. A -.
light balloon will continue to go up and a heavy one down, until the
pilot valves gas or drops weight, o_ the balloon, on its way up, passes
the height at which its bag is full, known as pressure height, and
either blows-off gas through its overpressure valves, or bursts This r_
physical fact is responsible for the expenditure of both gas and ballast
on every flight. In operation, an airship must sacrifice almost 1_ of
its gross lift for every 100 ft rise in altitude, and must carry a min-
imum of 3% of its gross lift in the form of ballast to prevent inadver- :
tent descent at inopportune times. In practice, its lifting gas Js
assu_ed to be about 95% pure (is., diffused 5% by air). Thus, a comm-
ercial airship must sacrifice about 13_ of its cargo capacity to fly at
minimum altitude (1500 ft) with minimum safe ballast. No other vehicle
ever seriously considered foc commerce is ,o inherently handicapped.
Altitude -Feg. 2 shows the aerostatic effect on design if an airship
269
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,D" "t.. _. were considered for transcontinental flight For scheduled, instrument
; t flight over eastern USA, the P_ requires a minimum cruising altitude
_" of 8000 ft, and over western USR 16,000 ft. The figure shows the in-/
__:' creases in diameter, frontal area, and volume necessary to achieve
_.. various cruise altitudes, compared to a sea level balloon having the
_'_ same lift capability. Rlternately, the lower block shows the effect on
'_ lift capability if the volume is kept constant and the design is used
'" at the various altitudes. This block explains the extreme difficulty
.;= all airships have had in crossing the United States in the past, as
:' they were all sea level designs. The SHENANDOAH flew 8o low she knock- ,.
j_ ed off her trailing wire antenna 'fish' at 2200 hrs near E1 Paso. The i.
_ did the same thing near Tours on the return maiden flight, also at
._: ; night, and carrying passengers: The _J_aONe eastbound, had to Jettison
: 6 tons of fuel and her onboard airplanes to proceed beyond Phoenix, and *-
_: was then so short of fuel she couldn't make it back to Lakehurst , i
_ - non-stop.
i.... None of the historic airship flights would have been sanctioned under
_', modern airways regulations, yet these flights are recalled by current
enthusiasts to extoll the capabilities of zeppelins. It shoul.d be
_,';_ noted that the figure represents static lift effects only. A larger
;_ airship would require still greater volume increase to carry the larger
,_ engines and greater fuel and ballast load of the larger, high level
design.
' " "-- - .... .
_" .I _,_. ' "_' __'_"l _""" ;<";:." "T,:-.
'. _,, - _i'*....... ,, • _-"----._._1" _'" i_-'_" ": "'_ ...... _""-. -/ ..... _J_. i-
_ _ , I ,, ,llll .i.,, -" "-. , _ _ -,-.I7/
......... I,_i / , .f" "i- 1"/.'" "-" ,I,
i Fi._ure 2. Static _ffect of Rltitude Figure 3. &tmgipheric Effects
; The real world his a variable atmosphere and cities are located at
various altitudes and climates. Pig. 3 Is a standard air chart which
his certain ielected cities spotted on It it their respective altitudel
It is seen that in airship designed for eastern _1 (8000 It design
altitude) could not operate into Denver. it design gross weight If the
ground temperature exceeded 85°P, although Denver's altitude is but
5280 ft. The same would be true it _exico Cit_, elevation 7347 ft0
2",_
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whenever the temperature exceeded 42°F. Only the 16,000 ft design
would be practical for both places, even though the Rocky Mountains I
would not have to be crossed from the eastern seaboard, for either 1destination.
ISuperheat - Yhis is the amount of increase of gas temperature above
ambient air. Superheat develops most noticeably when the airship is
moored out on the field on a sunny day. Even at Santiago, elevation
1675 ft, the airship will be at 7,400 £_ density altitude if 40 ° of
superheat is allowed to develop on a 100°F day. A sea level design
airship with full cells will blow off gas equivalent to 18% of its
gross lift under such conditions. Yhla happened to the GP_AP at Los
Pmgelee. As the field had no refilling facilities, the GRAF was s'_ _
heavy at take-off, she left without ballast and made it over the _le_ !phone wires at the end of the field with 3 ft to spare. Eckener
mentions a 'cat-walk' crew, whose duty it was to step off, or back on_o °
a hooted zeppelin, depending on changing superheat as clouds or rain
showers went by. Larger zeppelins will require that the field have
gas, water and fuel pu_ping facilities to maintain the airship at
correct equilibrium under changing conditions. The _KRON experienced
this situation at Petrie Is. Karine Base, and the MACON at Opa-Locka.
In both episodes, alternate rain and sun aggravated the troubles, as
rain soaked _oveLs may add 10% to the gross weight of the ship. t
Rain, Snow and Ic¢ _Jads - If extra gas is added to permit take-off
with a load of rain, snow or ice on the cover, this gas will be blown-
off when the ship reaches design altitude. Cold weather will normally
allow take-off, whereas in hot weather the gas cells may become full
before the extra lift to carry the load is obtained. While moored,
snow and ice may cause high local structural stresses at the horizontal
fin attach points. Nobile recounts bro_ing for two days to prevent
snow accumulations from buckling his hull at these points. Andree's
log books show his balloon suffered acutely from snow and ice loads in
flight, and they leave the recommendation that means be developed to
heat the cover end prevent such accumulations. Nobile's controls from
tight on hie return from the North Pole. His tragic crash ie attribu-
table indirectly to having to atop the ship while the jammed controls
were freed. However glorious the record of the German passenger zeppe-
lins, they never atteapted a North Atlantic crossing in the winter sea-
son. Only a few yeare later, green crews flew combat planes over this
route year 'round. De-icing remains a development of large proportion
facing those who would resurrect the zeppelin.
AWROOYINMZCS
Knut _ckener claimed that airshipo flew naturally, unlike airplanes
271 l
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whic'_ depended on some trick to keep it in balance. The for:e center
comparisons, shown in Fig 4, indicate the airship ,my be the trickier
of the two. In airplane configuration terms, the airship _s a 'tail-
less' design, meaning the tail control surfaces are carried on the
i "_ wing itself, -the.wing being the h,_ll of the airship. While the center
of pressure (c.p.) and the center of gravity are virtually coincident
on an airplane, the c.p. is far forward of the c.g. on the airship
_ when it enters a gust. The airship has a third force center, the cen-
ter of bouyancy (c.b.) located high, but directly above, the c.g.
_ This arrangement provides a steble restorin C moment whenever the hull i
develops lift. It is seen that the low slung engines of the airship _ :
always produce a pitch-up. C.P. Iovement on an airplane is expressed _
_ as a percentage of the length of the wing cord. O_ an airship, it is
_, a percentage of the length of the entire hull. Tailless airplanes "_
j cause design control difficultiea_ so does the airship. The inter- F
*_'1 relationship of forces about these three centers apparently require a
great deal of experience for the pilot to assess correctly. For
: instance, a heavy ship will be flown dynaJically in a nose up attitude. :
• But an airship at neutral bouyancy, trimeed statically nose heavy, will
appea_ to fly in the same attitude. Consumption of the fuel and water
" ballast causes the c.g. to rise, thus reducing its powe_ to provide
stable restoring moments. A light _hip flies and handles differently ,_
_- than a heavy ship.%
, Controls - The destabilizing force
_: _----_ _--'_/-/ always produced by _sts on the
forwar_ hull is countered by th_
: -- large control surfaces. Their
movement has been a field for de-
_' _ _ velo_nt of desi_ phi losophy.
if not for satisfactozy solution
_, of the problel they present. The
_r_'-"_"_'_.._ I._/_-_ problem is that rapid movement of i
_ the surfaces tends to produce
forces so high as to endanger the
integrity OE the hull. On the
other hand, slow motion produces
Figure 4. Force Center Comparisons very sluggish control response.
: It sounds Incredulous to learn
that it took 2S seconds to move the LOS MIG_L_S elevator through full _
_ travel, and that Norway was proud of his solution for the R-IO0 which
only penLitted the full strength of the hel_mmen to move the control
3° initially. Then, as the ship responded, additional deflection /
_1 could be applied. Full deflection took about 30 seconds: Norway re-
calls passing thr_ a squall at night, near Montreal, when the ship was !
tossed uptm:4 3200 ft into the clouds, spun 92" in direction, and
- 232
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pitched nose down 35o, all in less than a minute. Actually, Norway'S S
statement proves the ship was actually uncontrollable under certain
conditions. Both the SHENANDOAH and MACON experienced moments when ,_
the rudder was a_plied one way and the nose moved initially in the
other. The SHE_.NDON_ Just missed a mountain at night. On the MACON,
the forces produced under this action carried away her upper fin. Be-
cause the airship has a very low thrust to weight rtio, and is slug- !
, gish in response to its controls, it can hardly avoid being carried _
above pressure height in a developing thunderstorm. It then blows-off
its gas, or overpressures and bursts its gas cells, leaving the airship
heavy as it encounters the corresponding down current. Either the
structure fails, as it did in the case of the SHENANDOAH and the DIX)IJ_ ,_
or the ship is left short of fuel and ballast with which to reach its _
destination. Because the trim of the airship a_d the forces developed _ ....
are so interelated the pilot may easily make an error of judgement. _r :
The MACON was 'light' when her fin ripped off and deflated her aft _
cells, due to the action of a violent down and side gust. without _w,
steering control and banging tail low, the pilot dumoed ballast heavi- _
ly. The MACON then rose above pressure height to 4850 ft and stayed _ r
there 16 minutes, blowing off gas. When it finally grew 'heavy' and
started down, it went all the way down into thr sea.
Airships driven into warmer air tend to sink until their gas tempera-
ture normalizes with the ambient air. The reverse is true when driven
into colder air. Under such conditions, the airship may at first balk
at climbing into warmer air, or descend into colder air. The AKRON
spent several hours cooling off her gas before she would descend into
the cool air overlaying San Diego on her first tcip west. Becau.e of
such 'tricks' airship schedules may only be set to the day, steam ship
: schedules to the early or late tide, while airline schedules may be set ',
to the hour, as Scandinavian Airlines demonstrated when pioneering the
North Polar route from western USA to Europe.
System_ have been proposed to eliminate the valving of gas, by various
means, or to recover the weight of fuel consumed by water recovery sys-
tems placed in the engine exhaust. None of these system_ would answer
the control requirement for successful penetration of violent atmos-
pheric conditions. Th_ glib answer is to avoid such conditions. If
the incident of violent weather coincides with the arrival of the ship
at her destination, the answer is no longer satisfactory. Alternate
bases, criminally lecking in the past, must be provided in any serious
plan of the future.
NOORZNG
A previous section discussed mooring problems associated with chapTing
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lift due to temperature variations _ '
and precipitation. This section
j will touch on mooring problems con- :"
i nected with wand° The problem dates ; i"
' _ back to the first involuntary free -: i '_
_, _ flight of a Montgolfier balloon, _
_,_ their second of _30cu ft capacity, ',:
_, _ when the wind tore loose the tether-
ing lines. A few days later it de-
_: " stroyed their 23,000 cuft balloon, _
y_ prepared for a demonstration before _ :_-_
: the Royal Academy. Both Eckener and i,_,_ _
'_ Lehman had their mooring accidents. _"._?" , _'
:_ The mooring system developed by the ,_.,_r_ _ _ _US Navy appears to represent the ,_-"'=_'
_ highest state of developmen_ of any, _?'_'- _ ,._p . ,
_.,- Dut it is desired to question one _ _ _
,, feature of this development, the ._:._,_,?._,_ _ _':
stern beam car. Fig. 5 shows this
car in _osition. It rode out of the .
dock athwartships, then transferred Figure 5. Stern Beam Car
.,_ to the rails of the mooring circle,
until the airship was headed into the wind. Then it was replaced by a
lighter 'riding-out" car which allowed the airship to rotate into the
"' wind with her nose secured to the mast at the center of the mooring
_ circle. The operation was reversed for docking the airship.
The stern car was in use in February 1933, when it was noted that
'_ ,, strong cross winds were heel_ng the AKRON 6° from vertical. An _nstant
later the lines tore sections of Frame 35, 17 and Zero out of the ship. ,
Frame 17 was damaged on the MACON from thermals while crossi_g Texas on
a sunny day, and is also the frame from which the upper fin of the
MACON separated, the day the MACON was lost. With this restraint sys-
tem the wire stays from the stern car do not pass into the center line
of the ship, while the nose is restrained at the center line. How much
strain did Frame 17 absorb during the undocking and docking operation,
and to what degree was this system of docking responsible for the suc-
cessive failures of Frame 17? Perhaps the floating hangar system
originally used was the optimum system.
STRUCTURE
Fig. 6 shows the differences in frame design used on the German and
American airships. Fig. 6a shows the radlal, wire braced Zeppelin Co.
typ_ frame. Fig. 6b shows the Goodyear design, an integrally braced,
deep triangular section, built-up girder ring. The fins of the AKRON-
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Figure 6c. Cruciform Tail
MACON were cantilevered from such rings. The side loads developed by
the fins due to cross winds while mooring would be transferred thru
these rings to the wire stays of the stern beam car. In contrast, the
fin spars on Zeppelin designs passed right thru the hull, in what is
called 'cruciform' design. Fig 6c shows how well braced the Zeppelin
fins were into the frames. The difference in design has occupied many
words of testimony, and any new design would revive the discussion all
over again.
METEOROLOGY
The original French Proclamation of 1783, prophesied that the taffeta
and paper machines "will some day prove serviceable to the wants of
society". So they have, particularly in the field of meteorology,
which has reciprocated by serving all aviation. In WWII, the air
transport command adopted 'pressure pattern' navigation, said then to
have been developed by the Zeppelin Co,,pany. It is astonishing to dis-
cover that in 1831 an American mechanical engineer, William Redfleld,
published a paper entitled "The Law of Storms" and in 1836, gave a set
of rules for determining the path of a hurricane and how to avoid sail-
ing into the center of it. An English museum curator, Henry Piddington '_
in Calcutta, read Redfleld's papers and soon marketed a "Sailor's Horn
Book" enclosing in cover pockets, celluloid guides for the Northern and
Southern hemispheres, with these, the knowledgeable ship's captain
1976007927-279
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could locate on his chart, the center of a storm, whether to run before
_ the storm or detour behind it, and what his sailing time would be •
_+ Fig. ? shows Eckener's use of this knowledge on his delivery flight
_. with the LOS ANGELES, and the maiden flight to the USA in the GRAF
-," ZEPPELIN. His long detours by way of the Madiera, Azores and Bermuda
Islands are plain to see. Of particular interest is his return journey
: in the GRAF, when he deliberately penetrated a front off the east coast
,_,' of the United States, and based on clear weather reports, planned a
great circle route from there all the way home. Instead, his I0000
_ extra miles of zigs and zage indicate the kind of weather he actually
_ ran around•
4_
.,_; +TL_NTtC,
-+
+
"°" ++.
Figure ?. Actual Routes vs Grea_ Circle
_ In January 1933, the captai_ of the AKRON detoured around the Great
Lakes to land the following day behind a storm that had confronted him
the night before when he had tried to land at Lakehurst. American air-
ship captains also learned meteorology, but were guided more by radio
reports than by the "Law of Storms". In April 1933, that same captain
' made several course reversals before choosing one that took him
+ straight Into the center of a storm, and eternity. On that night,
+, static had partially blocked his reception of a full weather report.
The literature suggests the airship was mishandled on the fatal nigh_.
It might be more accurate to admit that zeppelins cannot survive some
storms.
"i
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There seem to be only two kinds of turbulence particularly dangerous
B to airships. One is a single violent gust not visibly associated with
a frontal passage, or any widely ranging thermals. It is undetectable
and experienced before the pilot can do anything. Such a gust appears '_
. to have torn the wing off a jet airliner climbing to altitude past Mr.
Fuji, and on 12 Feb 1935, one tore the upper fin off the MACON, three
t miles off Pt. Sur, over the Pacific Ocean on a generally overcast day
when violent updrafts are least expected. Another kind of turbulence
is associated with frontal passage and air mass thunderstorms. The
principal currents are up and down, in clear air or in precipitation,
_ at any altitude, and occasionally, strong horizontal gusts are encount-
ered at the same time. The sequence of zeppelin failure under these
conditions has been mentioned previously. Musk, a contemporary of the
WWI zeppelin age, analyzed a sample gust of 6 ft per second and con-
+ cluded that gusts are no more dangerous than turns, certainly a now
outdated judgement. One wonders if anyone has designed a zeppelin to .;_
""'" modern gust data and found that it could be built light enough to
carry a viable payload?
PERFORMAblE AND ECONOMY
.?
._ +
Economic cost formulations are published by governmental regulating
agencies, although each manufacturer and user has his own rules as well i_
When government engages in a vast new engineering project it tends to
make its own, new set of rules. It seems adequate a,_ this time to :;
make comparisons based on the weight of metal need to produce a given _
design, and the performance in terms of payload and range obtained by
this investment. '"
TIPE' LZ-26 LZ-85 LZ-99 LZ'I04 8TAAKER LINKE LZ-129 AERCM DC-6 'mY_T(_ /
: II S.L. & H • lOOg purity VI H_FNAN MAC_ BRITTANIA
DATE .191/, 1916 1917 1_i ? ,, 1917 1919 1936 1931 19&7 19_
VCL. N ou ft 0°795 2.0 2.04 2._ - - 7.06 6.85....
We N Ibs 36.8 - 51.0 51.5 18.0 17.6 260.22_2.& _9.8 90.6 i
Wt_ N lbs 56.6 1_..5 _5.0 166.0 2.6.5 32.1 6.19.0 6,03.0 106.2. 1By.O
We/Wee 65.2 - 35.2 31.Z 68.0 5_.7 62.6 60,3 /+6,8 _9.0
PAI£O_ II Ib, 0.? 5.0 9.9 26.5 2.2 -- 36.++ 30.0_ 8.0 3t+.O
_ATLOAD_to 1.2_ 3.51 6.83 16.0 8._ - 8.01- 7._ 18.&
CEILINGM ft 1.5 15.0 19.0 I,5 19,_ee 10.5 I,5 1.5 - -
P_ 50 70 ':
CEI_ .......... ._0 ?
_Esttmted Alrplane oont'_ent _Ad_ustable pitoh propellers ]_ - atllton
Figure 8. Design Data Comparisons -+
Fig. 8 shows data for a reasonable sample of airplanes and zeppelins
from WWI forward. Because the data is obtained from so many different ,,
i
/
277
1976007927-281
++ I f
• z+_,_++ + J ............................. i*,
J
sources, no real accuracy is claimed. It is felt that the figures are
sufficiently representative for the task at hand. WWI data, with two
_. exceptions, applies to bombing missions over England. Post WWII data
_.+ applies to a minimum New York to Paris capability.
At first glance, it becomes apparent that there never was a 25 ton pay-
load zeppelin, despite the almost daily assurances of Enthusiasts that
such payloads are 'small' for zeppelins. The Enthuslasts and certain
reference books alike, seem confused by the difference between "usefu)
_ lift' and 'payload'. Next, the payload to gross lift ratio is little
if any better than airplanes of the past, inferior to more recent air- i
planes and getting more inferxor all the time. _
The five WWI zeppelins show the influence of design altitude on the
_.! payload and range capabilities of a zeppelin. The first zeppelins were '
] sea level designs. Antiaircraft fire soon drove them higher. The bombloads peaked at 9,900 Ibs with the LZ-99 of 1917, which had a designceiling of 19,000 ft. The next example is the fame_Bulgaria to Khartumand return zeppelin, LZ-104 (L-59) which ,carried 26,500 Ibs of supplie&
The LZ-t04 was a specially prepared LZ-99 type, with an extra lift bay
added, increasing its volume by 18%. The great increase in payload and
range was not due to extra lifting bay but that it flew a sea level
route, while the LZ-99 at 19,000 ft was operating at a density ratio of
.55. At that height LZ-99's lift was only 75,600 ibs, and her bomb
load 13.5% of that. The LZ-104 with the same structure, was operating
+ at sea level gross lift, -that is to say, grossly overloaded, for a one
_ii" time flight.
The above possibly explains the tragedy of the L-72 (LZ-IlT?), of a
class designed to operate at 26,400 ft (5000 meters}, the peak develop-
ment of German WWI zeppelins. Seized by France for 'reparations',
named the DIXMUDE, she was used to surpass Germany's feat with the LZ-
104, to impress the French African co]anita by flying around them. The
DIXMUDE was destroyed on the second such political exploit near Sicily,
probably by structural failure in the vicinity of a storm, though she
also burned in the air.
Designed to airline structural standards, the HINDENBURG (LZ-129) re-
quired 7 million cuft to slightly exceed the feat of the LZ- 104 with
2,4 million cu ft. To cross the United States in accordance with air-
line standards will require airships that many times larger again, to
carry the same payload as the LZ-104.
Two WWl airplane designs appear in the figure. The Staaken Vl bomb
load in percentage of gross weight (% Payload/Wto) exceeded that of the
Zeppelins. The Linke-Hoffman II, completed only after the war, is
278
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14shown in an overload condition. Its 54.7% empty to gross weight ratio
(We/Wto) is the harbinger of airplane structural efficiency to come, -
20 years later. The Staaken Co. was a division of the Zeppelin Co.,
created by Count Zeppelin to produce bombing airplanes for the Army,
because he never had any faith in the zeppelin employed as a bomber, i
The figures presented for the HINDENBURG are not the more favorable }
ones representing hydrogen filling, but less favorable ones for helium _
at 95% purity and 1500 ft cruise altitude, which is the basis for the
AKRON-MACON figures. The relatively s_all DC-6 is seen to be far s_
superior in terms of structural ratio and almost matching the HINDEN- ;
3
BURG in payload to weight ratio. The BRITTANIA surpasses the HINDEN- -_.,
BURG in both categories. The crew to passenger ratio alone may spell
the difference between profit and loss for airline operations. The t_;
record is discouraging for any mode of transportation which demands a
high level of manpower to operate.
i
Staaken E.4/20 all-metal airIiner of 1920
,S
J
Armstrong Whitworth ATALANTA class of 1932
Figure 9. Airplane Development Delay
Airplane-Airshlp Competition- Enthusiasts llke to indulge in a theory ;
that airplane interests omlaplred to delay the zeppelin progress. '::
Figure 9 shows that an outstanding airplane development was seemingly
suppressed for more than the number of years Germany was prohibited
279
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from building large commercial zeppelins. The upper photo shows a
Staaken passenger plane built of aluminum, equivalent in construction
to the Boeing 247 and DC-3'8 of the 1930's, flown in 1921 before being
_ ordered destroyed by the Allied Control Commission. The same design _!
apparently resurfaced 12 years later on Imperial Airways, lower photo.
_:4 So much for the consplrary theory.
eaS/PAYLOaD
The range payload curva8 of Fig. _ i_
'.'_ 10 complete the story. The
BRITTANIA at 185,000 lbs almost ._ ,/fH....,._ :_
encompasses the performance of _j
zeppelins weighing 2¼ times more. J_ l,_-J_o_ /-j/'/'%_,,...,,., :-
_ The 707-320, three quarters as "*_ (_,_._/,,_ e/// /X,..f,o,,,.,_ (_'_.
" heavy as the HINDENBURG, complete- _ I _"'m, *"_ _'_ ......._-'-_ '
'_ IF surpasses it. Because air- [[_'_/| 'i =r'*_'_'t_') /_e .... II_, x_" :'_ " " _! _
F planes shown are 4 to 7 times I_ _ - _cz:_ J
:_, faster than any airship ever built, | _ J
,_ and return of investment is depen- / o _ _ _ ,_" _- - -
dent on productivity, the p oduct t _v,_H,r/ ,,_o_,.,
_r-i of payload and speed, it is un-
i necessary to even shc_ the Figure 10.
relative speed or productivity of Range-Payload Comparisons
_ the airplane and the airship. This
4.
_"i figure indicates the magnitude of the improvement necessary to produce
zeppelins that will be economically viable, were they to ever overcome
i_" their operational difficulties.
/
_' CONCLUS IOtaS
I
• The Enthusiast recites like catechism that the advantage of the air-
ship Is that it requires no power to develop llft (unlike an airplane)
and that this feature is its great advantage in economy and fuel
savings over the airplane. This rote ignores the extreme weight empty :
penalty and high drag associated with the enormous gas filled structum
required to produce bouyant flit, which inevitably defeats the airship
in any comparison with the airplane in air co_merce. But for the ::,
technological accident that large volumes of hydrogen became available
to lift transatlantic payloads in bouyant aircraft a generation before _,
large and reliable engines beca_ available to lift those payloads in ,L
: airplanes, the airship would never have been developed. It follows
that when the &ngines became available the airship faded from the
scene, and there appears no valid reason for ressurecting them as air
carrlezs.
c.
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I/The cathedral-like hangars which remain at Lakehurst and Moffett N.A.S.
for one of man's most beautiful creations, the zeppelin, give pause
for reflection of a brief chronicle of bouyant flight:
"The French Government of 1783, 'It is only a machine.., which will
some day prove serviceable to the wants of society'.
Sir George Cayley, in 1815, explaining why he was pursueing flight by
means of inclined planes, '...my object was to leave out the unwieldy
bulk of balloons altogether.'
f_
AdmWm A Moffett, USA, testifying before Congress, 'I woul_ willingly ",;
sacrifice the purchase of one cruiser for two airships of the same
cost, but would not sacrifice any airplane funds and transfer them to
the airship fund...'
Sir Dennistoun Burney (in 1922 originator of the British Government's
'Burney Scheme' which resulted in producing the R-lO0 and R-101) writ-
ing in 1929, 'As a result of the last seven years investigation and
work upon R-100, I am firmly convinced that airship enthusiasts not
only overstated their case, but failed to realize that a vessel that
could neither make a landing without elaborate extraneous aid, nor be
housed or rigidly secured in rough weather, must always remain a
doubtful value for commerclal purposes ....... '.
Hugo Eckener in his 1949 book, '...the role of this aerial vehicle in
commerce seems to have ended after a brief period of glory ..... for
speed and time saving are trump cards'".
Frank Lloyd Wright reportedly shook his head when he looked at St.
Patrick's cathedral. Asked why he shook his head he answered that he
approved of the deslgnbut not its purpose. That about sunm up the
case against the commercial carrier zeppelin.
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